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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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12 APRIL 1972


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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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Confidential

12 APRIL 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 15)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 3 - 9 APRIL 1972

Moscow (2971 items)

Indochina	(3%)	11%
[Communist Offensive	(--)	2%]
in South Vietnam		
[Strikes on DRV	(--)	2%]
[Le Duan's Birthday	(--)	2%]
CPSU 24th Congress	(12%)	8%
Anniversary		
Hungarian Liberation	(0.3%)	5%
Anniversary		
China	(5%)	4%
AUCCTU 15th Congress	(13%)	4%
Kosygin in Iraq	(--)	4%

Peking (1303 items)

Domestic Issues	(34%)	32%
Indochina	(30%)	28%
[Communist Offensive	(--)	12%]
in South Vietnam		
[Sihanouk in DPRK	(--)	8%]
[Strikes on DRV	(--)	4%]
Maltese Prime Minister	(4%)	11%
in PRC		
Palestinian People's	(--)	5%
Congress		
Senegal National Day	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist media have claimed military "victories" and civilian "uprisings" in many parts of South Vietnam, and an order from the command of the South Vietnamese liberation army (PLAF) on 11 April called for further offensive action to achieve "complete victory." Following the initial thrust of the offensive in Quang Tri, the focus of the propaganda shifted to Binh Long Province northwest of Saigon--an area which some comment noted could be used as a staging ground for further important offensives. The first substantive report--carried on 10 April by Hanoi radio--on the North Vietnamese party (VWP) Central Committee's "recent" 20th plenum suggests that the meeting endorsed the launching of the current offensive in South Vietnam. According to the report, the plenum held that "victories" since the 1968 Tet offensive "have opened up the realistic possibility of defeating the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine."

High-level Hanoi condemnation of U.S. air and naval action against the DRV came in an 11 April government statement protesting the "continuous" attacks since 6 April "at President Nixon's orders." The statement contained the first direct acknowledgment of U.S. charges that North Vietnamese forces have invaded the South. The charges had been referred to obliquely, however, in a 6 April DRV Foreign Ministry protest against air strikes that day which ridiculed the "illusion" that the United States could deter the North from supporting the South.

In a foreign ministry statement on 10 April seconding Hanoi's protest of the 6th against the U.S. bombing, Peking acclaimed the "magnificent victories" won in the communist offensive while going to considerable lengths to rebut Washington's argument that the offensive represents an invasion from the North. The statement showed signs of restraint, containing no direct attack on the Nixon Administration by name and failing to reaffirm Peking's support for the war effort.

Moscow has to date issued no official endorsement of Hanoi's protests, although solidarity with the DRV was reaffirmed in a Soviet-GDR communique at the conclusion of SED party chief Honecker's 4-10 April visit. Moscow's cautious approach is also evidenced by its avoidance of any personal criticism of the President.

HANOI, FRONT ACCLAIM "VICTORIES" IN SOUTH VIETNAM OFFENSIVE

Typical of the broad communist claims regarding the current offensive, the 11 April order from the South Vietnam liberation army command

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maintains that PLAF troops are "winning great victories on all fronts" and that "our people throughout the South are arising vigorously, smashing the U.S.-Thieu clique's yoke of domination, and gaining control." Calling for further attacks, uprisings, and proselyting, the order pledges to "develop the offensive impetus to gain great victories, smash Vietnamization, and bring our people's resistance to complete victory."

The PLAF order was welcomed on the 12th in Hanoi press editorials which acclaimed the "vigorous" development of the offensive. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's editorial, like other comment, reflected Hanoi's apparent calculation that the South Vietnamese army, without the support of U.S. ground forces, would be vulnerable to the communists' main-force attacks. Appraising the situation in the South, it observed that the U.S. army--the "main pillar" of the war--had been disengaged from the fighting, and it claimed that the ARVN is "obviously exhausted following its heavy, repeated defeats" in 1971. The editorial called upon the communist "regular units" to "deal the enemy vigorous blows," to attack him "continuously and very strongly," and to "fight to break the backbone of the puppet regular units" and "make him panicked and confused as soon as he catches sight of our troops." The paper maintained: "We are now stronger than before and the enemy is weaker than before. Nothing can check our advance."

BINH LONG The importance of the attacks northwest of Saigon, FIGHTING in Binh Long Province, was underscored in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 8th which praised the PLAF there for "destroying a big chunk" of the defense network "established to block the way and protect" Saigon. Suggesting that the way has been opened for further attacks, the editorial maintained that the area of eastern Nam Bo, which includes Binh Long, is a position from which to "stage offensives that exert a strong effect on the southern cities and rural areas, from Saigon to the Mekong Delta." It added that "the glorious Binh Long victory" had not only "rocked the enemy's important defense line" but also "directly created conditions for the revolutionary forces to develop their offensive position in this strategic area."

In a review of the situation throughout the South, a NHAN DAN editorial on the 8th claimed that the PLAF in Binh Long, in fighting from the 5th to the 7th, had "seriously damaged" the ARVN 5th Division, "forced all of the 9th Battle Group to surrender," and "annihilated" several other ARVN units,

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"completely liberating Loc Ninh district" and seizing control of Highway 13 north of Chon Thanh--the southernmost district capital in the province. A Liberation Radio broadcast on the same day pressed similar claims and asserted that the people of Loc Ninh district "rose up" in coordination with the military attacks and were "eagerly constructing a revolutionary administration." This broadcast, like other commentaries, stressed that the Binh Long attacks came at a time when ARVN forces were dispersed to meet other assaults. It took note of reports that the Thieu government has had to use the airborne battalion that guards the presidential palace to defend the outskirts of Saigon and has had to assign military cadets to guard duty.

Details of alleged communist military achievements in Binh Long Province were supplied in a Front radio broadcast on the 9th which claimed that 3,500 allied troops were put out of action from 5 to 7 April; it alleged that almost 1,000 of them were captured, including high-ranking officers and U.S. advisers. The radio said that 400 military vehicles were seized, including nearly 50 tanks and armored personnel carriers, and that 10 aircraft were shot down. It went on to claim that the PLAF wiped out two multibattalion units, one regiment, and numerous battalions.

Another Front broadcast, also on the 9th, claimed that a third multibattalion unit--the 52d Battle Group--was "annihilated" on 7 April north of the Binh Long provincial capital of An Loc (designated Hon Quan by the communists). This feat, according to the broadcast, "completely isolated" the allied troops in An Loc. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 10th, which highlighted this "large-scale annihilating battle," again stressed the importance of the eastern Nam Bo battlefield. And an article in the army paper on the 11th, hailing alleged communist victories in the neighboring province of Tay Ninh, claimed that the PLAF is taking control of Highway 22 in that province as well as of Highway 13 in Binh Long. The article said that the fighting in the two provinces had forced U.S. Commander Abrams to move part of the ARVN 21st Division into the area from the southern part of the country.

IMPACT ON ARVN Hanoi and Front propaganda continues to place considerable stress on the need to carry on proselyting among South Vietnamese Government forces, and comment on the fighting claims significant success in such efforts. The

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proselyting duties of the PLAF were officially reviewed in an instruction from the army's political department, publicized by the Front on 6 April, which recalled the PRG's 25 January 10-point statement of policy toward people "forced by the U.S.-Thieu clique to serve as mercenaries."* The 10 points have been recalled in other propaganda, including the 8 April NHAN DAN editorial; NHAN DAN typically held that they have been "exerting an increasingly strong influence on the ranks of the puppet army, showing the puppet troops the path to follow"

The NHAN DAN editorial, in dwelling on the alleged failure of Saigon's armed forces to deal with the current offensive, suggested that the communists may be counting on a breakdown of these forces in order to accomplish their objectives in the offensive. The editorial claimed broadly that "in the atmosphere of seething attacks and uprisings by our armed forces and people on the vast frontline, Saigon puppet units have begun to continuously stage antiwar acts and to surrender and desert en masse." It singled out the alleged defection under fire of the 3d Division's 56th Regiment in Quang Tri and the "collective surrender" of the 5th Division's 9th Battle Group in Binh Long; and it went on to observe that such actions clearly show that the "puppet forces" are declining in the face of the "liberation troops' offensive strength" and that the communists' strength and the allies' "weak and defeated position" are "having a strong effect on all troop categories of the puppet Saigon forces."

As has been the case during previous major engagements, including Lam Son 719, communist media have quickly exploited the claimed capture or defection of ARVN officers, describing the circumstances in detail and publicizing purported statements by the officers. For example, VNA on the 7th announced that the officers and men of the 56th regiment had been brought to a "specified place" where they were "received" and were given an explanation of the PRG's 10-point policy. VNA cited the commander and deputy commander of the regiment--both lieutenant colonels--as stating that their opposition to the "brutal" implementation of Vietnamization had caused them to refuse to obey orders from the division command; they were also quoted as saying they had "seen clearly" that the ARVN "could not resist the revolutionary forces as the U.S.

*The 10-point statement is discussed in the 2 February TRENDS, pages 21-23, and in the 5 April TRENDS, page 4.

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troops continued to be pulled out and the men in the Saigon army, fed up with the war, no longer wanted to fight." On the 9th VNA described the surrender of the 56th Regiment's headquarters at Camp Carroll, indicating that the camp's defenders had contacted the "liberation" forces by radio to inform them they did not wish to fight and to arrange their surrender. The 8 April NHAN DAN editorial had ridiculed the reported announcement by the ARVN that the 56th regiment's commander committed suicide.

DRV GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ASSAILS UNLIMITED U.S. STRIKES

The U.S. decision to step up air and naval attacks against the North in the face of the communist offensive in South Vietnam prompted a DRV Government statement* on 11 April which called the action "an extremely serious new step in escalating the war." It specifically protested the "continuous" attacks since 6 April "at President Nixon's orders" against the Vinh Linh region, Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces, and Vinh city. The statement cited Secretary Laird for the remark that the United States would intensify and prolong its attacks on the DRV, and it went on to claim that "the White House spokesman" not only said there would be no limit to the use of air power against the North but "threatened to strike at Haiphong harbor." A NHAN DAN editorial on the 12th cited UPI in specifying that this "threat" was voiced on 8 April, along with the Press Secretary's additional "hint" that the United States might even bring infantrymen back to South Vietnam.

The government statement contained Hanoi's first direct acknowledgment of U.S. charges that the DRV had invaded the South. As carried by VNA in English, it said: "To conceal their criminal acts of war escalation, the U.S. ruling circles have put forward deceitful contentions, calling black white.

* Hanoi has issued a number of government statements on Indochina developments during the Nixon Administration, but this is the first one pegged to air strikes against the DRV. It apparently was issued at the government rather than the foreign ministry level because it was responsive to a new U.S. policy decision--to extend the scope of the air strikes. Earlier government statements included those of 12 June 1969 on U.S. decisions on troop withdrawal, 6 November 1969 on the President's speech outlining his Vietnamization policy, 30 April 1970 on the incursion into Cambodia, and, most recently, 10 February 1971 on Lam Son 719.

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They have rehashed shopworn contentions about 'North Vietnam aggression against South Vietnam,'" (The Vietnamese word which VNA translated as "aggression" is "xam luoc," but in this context it also could be translated as "invasion.") The NHAN DAN editorial on the 12th was even more precise in referring to U.S. statements when it said that "frenzied" acts against the North, including B-52 bombings deeper into North Vietnam territory, were being justified by such "vile arguments" as the claim that "the bombings were 'retaliation against the communist troops' offensive across the DMZ'"

The 6 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement, protesting air strikes that day and claiming the downing of 10 planes, had contained a passage which seemed clearly to have been prompted by the U.S. charges of a DRV invasion. The statement said:

In carrying out their new military adventures against the DRV, the U.S. imperialists continue to nurture the illusion that they can oppress the Vietnamese people and force them to give up their legitimate right to self-defense against U.S. imperialism and its henchmen, that they can force the North Vietnamese people to give up their sacred duties regarding the freedom and independence of their fatherland and regarding their kith-and-kin compatriots in South Vietnam.

Hanoi's pledge to fulfill its duty as the great rear for the frontline in the South and its support for its southern compatriots is standard fare in the propaganda, but this point had not been made in any of the previous nine foreign ministry statements on air strikes during the Nixon Administration.

It was left to the government statement to revive Hanoi's formulation that justifies a Northern military presence in the South which it does not directly admit. Thus, the statement said that "wherever there are U.S. aggressors on Vietnamese territory, all Vietnamese have the right and duty to fight against them to defend the independence and freedom of their fatherland." This formulation appeared frequently in the propaganda after the beginning of the

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U.S.-DRV Paris talks in May 1968,* but prior to its use in the government statement its last known appearance in the propaganda was in December 1970--in the wake of large-scale U.S. air strikes against the North in November and the abortive prisoner-rescue attempt. Defense Minister Giap, speaking at a meeting marking army day, expressed the DRV's "right to track and shoot down all U.S. planes, regardless of type if they violate our airspace." He went on to say that "we have the right to concentrate troops in whatever zone in order to protect our fatherland."

After declaring that the Vietnamese have a "right" to fight wherever there are U.S. aggressors, the government statement cryptically said "the U.S. Administration also fabricated the myth about the so-called 'understanding'** between the United States and the DRV." It did not directly indicate that the "understanding" concerned DRV military restraint as a quid pro quo for the U.S. bombing halt. But it reaffirmed Vietnamese determination to "fight until not a single U.S. aggressor remains on their territory," and it added that the United States had invented the story of "North Vietnamese violating the understanding" as a pretext for stepping up the war against the DRV "in defiance" of the October 1968 U.S. pledge "to completely and unconditionally end the bombing of the DRV."

* For example, Premier Pham Van Dong, speaking at a National Assembly session, was reported on 24 May 1968 to have said: "All our people, 31 million as one, are determined to fight and defeat the enemy. Wherever there are enemies, every Vietnamese has a right to go there to fight them." Earlier in the war, Hanoi had periodically explicitly denied the presence of VPA troops in the South. On six occasions between January 1966 and February 1967, VNA issued "authorized" denials of Western reports on the VPA presence.

** The matter of the "understanding" has come up only infrequently in official statements. It did appear in the 29 December 1971 foreign ministry statement on the sustained air strikes--which said that Secretary Laird even put out the "fantastic allegation" that the DRV had violated an "understanding"--and in foreign ministry statements of 21 and 27 November 1970.

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The government statement declared that the Administration has embarked on "new military adventures against the DRV in the hope of salvaging" the Vietnamization plan. It added that this further demonstrates that Vietnamization is aimed not at ending the war but at prolonging and expanding it. The foreign ministry statement on the 6th had atypically included in its list of appeals to fraternal socialist and other peace- and justice-loving nations the plea that they demand an end to the Administration's Vietnamization policy. The ministry statement, in addition to calling for an end to "encroachments" on the DRV, appealed for help in persuading the Administration to respond to the PRG's seven-point peace plan. In an earlier passage it observed that U.S. and world opinion is demanding that the Administration end its "sabotage" of the Paris talks.*

The government statement's concluding appeal to the fraternal socialist and other countries included a call for them "to extend even stronger support and assistance to the just patriotic fight of the Vietnamese people, and of the peoples of Laos and Cambodia as well, until total victory." Similar references to increased aid had appeared in the foreign ministry statements of 29 December 1971 and of 6 March. At the same time, the government statement said that U.S. bombs and shells have been unable and will never be able to subdue the heroic Vietnamese people. It added that "no brute force and no insolent threats can shake the Vietnamese people's determination to fight for the independence and freedom of their fatherland." It "hailed" both the feats of the North, which it claimed had "shot down many aircraft and sunk or damaged many U.S. warships," and the "extremely glorious victories of the heroic compatriots."

PRG SUPPORT The PRG issued a Foreign Ministry statement on 8 April, supporting the DRV statement of the 6th, but as yet there has been no endorsement of the DRV Government statement. And on the 9th Front media publicized a PLAF Command congratulatory message, dated the 7th, to the

* VNA's Paris-to-Hanoi service transmission on 12 April carried statements from the DRV and PRG delegations to the Paris conference "demanding" that the 148th session be held on 13 April. The delegations had issued similar statements last week.

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VPA High Command on the claimed downing of 15 planes between 1 and 6 April.* The PRG Foreign Ministry statement, as usual, followed the general format of the DRV statement. Thus it said that the "new military adventure" of the Administration was aimed at "forcing" the Vietnamese people to give up their legitimate right to self-defense. The PLAF Command matched Hanoi's pledge to its kith-and-kin in the South when it "solemnly warned" the United States that "Vietnam is indivisible and the Vietnamese people are indivisible" and that if the United States continues to attack the North, "the southern troops and people will deal them punitive blows that will be 10 or 100 times stronger." It expressed the determination of "all southern cadres, combatants, and compatriots . . . to frustrate the new aggressive plot of the U.S. imperialists, to liberate the South and to defend the North."

Both the LPA and Liberation Radio commentaries on the 5th warned of more U.S. actions against the North, but while LPA predicted heavier defeats for the United States, Liberation Radio pointed to the indivisibility of Vietnam and said that "with the 'when the South calls, the North will answer; when the North calls, the South is present on time' spirit, . . . the southern armed forces and people are ready to perform steel-like acts to knock out the enemy if he dares to recklessly lay a hand on our beloved North."

DRV CLAIMS 22 U.S. PLANES DOWNED IN APRIL, URGES VIGILANCE

The 12 April NHAN DAN editorial rounds up Hanoi's alleged victories against U.S. air and naval strikes against the DRV. Noting that the northern armed forces and people are launching an emulation movement to accelerate production, to be ready to fight, and to give due punishment to the U.S. "aggressors for their new escalation," NHAN DAN claims that since 1 April,

* The PRG has endorsed seven of the 10 DRV foreign ministry statements protesting U.S. air strikes during the Nixon Administration; it most recently failed to issue a foreign ministry statement following the 17 February 1972 DRV statement. However, on 18 February 1972 the PLAF Command issued congratulations on the alleged downing of seven planes. The PLAF Command had also sent congratulations on 22 November 1970 on the downing of six planes.

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22 U.S. planes including three B-52's have been downed in the Fourth Military Region, bringing its total downed over the DRV to 3,468, and that eight U.S. ships "were hit and set ablaze." A later report on the 12th brings the number of ships reportedly hit to nine.

The editorial, in addition to citing such "threats" against the DRV as the possible bombing of Haiphong, details the U.S. buildup. It observes that the United States is increasing the number of aircraft carriers in the area to six, that many phantom jets have been sent from Japan to Da Nang, and that additional B-52's brought in raised the total of those aircraft to 100. It also charges that the U.S. Seventh Fleet has used cruisers and destroyers to strike daily at coastal areas of southern DRV as well as to provide fire support to ARVN troops. A 10 April Hanoi radio domestic commentary had cited AP in claiming that the Seventh Fleet had "more than doubled its force last week." The commentary said that in addition to more aircraft carriers, the Administration had mobilized nine cruisers and destroyers. It noted that two additional squadrons of F-4 jets had been brought from Japan, raising the total number of jets involved in air attacks against both the North and South to "more than 500." And it, too, said 100 B-52's were now operating in the area.

Hanoi report on 6 April that 10 U.S. planes were downed that day, seven in Quang Binh and three in Vinh Linh. Three additional planes were reportedly downed on the 7th in the same areas. On the 9th, Hanoi said that a B-52 had been downed that day in Vinh Linh--the third since 2 April.* And on the 10th, Hanoi claimed three planes, two over Vinh city (Nghe An Province) and one over Con Co Island. Although the propaganda has said that a number of U.S. pilots have been "annihilated," there have been no reports of captured U.S. pilots.

The alleged downing of the 10 planes on 6 April prompted a congratulatory message from President Ton Duc Thang--dated the 6th and carried in DRV media the following day. Thang

* See the 5 April TRENDS, pages 4-6. U.S. spokesmen have denied that any B-52's have ever been downed, but on the 9th the U.S. command reported that one had been "slightly damaged by a surface-to-air missile" that day but returned to base safely.

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had similarly congratulated the people and armed forces in the Ham Rong brigade area last December for the alleged downing of the 100th U.S. plane in that area. As in that message, Thang now called on the people to "closely unite, further heighten their vigilance, and stand ready to fight"

The VNA press review on the 6th noted that commendations were issued by the VPA High Command for action during the week but, strangely, there has been no mention of any VPA congratulatory messages since then. Such messages are common; they had been issued in February of this year and in December 1971, as well as during earlier periods of massive bombing in March 1971 and May and November 1970.

VPA ORDER, PREMIER'S
DIRECTIVE ON VIGILANCE

Hanoi's continuing attention to heightening vigilance and combat-readiness has included a 6 April VPA High Command order to the North Vietnamese armed forces and a "recent" DRV Premier's Office directive on combat-readiness and air defense tasks, publicized on the 7th. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 7th called for implementation of the VPA order, as did a 6 April Hanoi radio commentary. The VPA High Command order--only the third to have been issued during the period of the Nixon Administration--is similar to the previous two in its basic appeals. An order was issued on 28 December 1971 at the time of sustained U.S. bombings, and one on 10 December 1970 urged implementation of the unprecedented joint VWP-Government appeal for vigilance that followed the massive November 1970 U.S. air strikes and abortive prisoner-rescue attempt at Son Tay.*

The current order calls for the protection of property and lives, the ensuring of public order and security, close coordination, and the downing of many U.S. planes and "capture of many aggressor pilots." It also urges the military to "completely and quickly annihilate the enemy's commando and surprise assault units if they venture to come," an element present in the 1970 order but not in the one of 1971. The current order includes a new element when it refers to the "firing at and sinking of many U.S. warships" and to "taking timely steps to suppress all

* See the TRENDS of 29 December 1971, pages 4-5, and of 16 December 1970, pages 1-4.

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sabotage." This time the order is specifically addressed to the "missile, radar, artillery, and naval forces" as well as to the usual antiaircraft, air force, regular army, security, and militia forces.

The directive from the Premier's Office "on strengthening combat-readiness and the people's air defense" calls on "all localities" to "really heighten vigilance" and organize combat-readiness satisfactorily.* Among other things, it orders militia and self-defense forces to consolidate and carry out patrol and guard duties, and it says "state organs must maintain round-the-clock duty during off hours and holidays." It calls for the building of sufficient shelters, the improvement of watch and alarm-sounding systems and first aid units, and the restriction and reduction of meetings and activities of large crowds. Like the VPA High Command order, it also calls for satisfactory implementation of communications and transportation tasks.

A 7 April NHAN DAN editorial, praising the Quang Binh and Vinh Linh forces for their "outstanding feat of arms in shooting down" 10 planes the previous day, similarly exhorts all localities to heighten combat-readiness and combat abilities. Like the directive of the same date, it urges the consolidation of the militia and self-defense forces. And it states that "party committee echelons and the administration" at basic levels in particular are required to "lead the increase in air defense, including the digging of pits and trenches and the organization of the alarm, evacuation, dispersion, first aid and other systems, and must control these activities permanently and closely."

* The Premier's Office is not known to have issued a previous directive devoted solely to combat-readiness and air defense tasks in the past three and a half years. However, in January 1971--after the unprecedented joint party-government appeal--an instruction was issued on stepping up "the emulation movement for production and combat preparedness among the North Vietnamese people and armed forces in 1971." It included a brief call for greater efforts in strengthening national defense and increasing combat-readiness against "all sabotage and provocative acts of the United States."

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DRV MILITARY COMMENT, PLENUM DEVELOPED RATIONALE FOR OFFENSIVE

Hanoi and Front propaganda for more than a year has been remarkably open about the communists' intention to launch a major offensive in South Vietnam after U.S. ground troops could no longer play a significant combat role. Authoritative military commentators have repeatedly maintained that the ARVN--unsupported by U.S. troops--could not fend off large-scale attacks by communist main-force units. On 24 March, only six days before the current offensive was initiated, Hanoi papers published an article by the military commentator "Chien Thang" (The Victor) which reiterated the view that the ARVN was "unable to stand on its own" and expressed the apparent thinking of Hanoi's military planners: "Only with 'big punches' of the regular forces can a party launch major annihilating battles and bring about a clear change in the balance of forces on the battlefield."

The Chien Thang article, with its optimistic appraisal of the "upgrading" trend of the communist military position, took on added significance with the release beginning on 27 March of major speeches at the DRV National Assembly session, held 20-25 March.* The language of the leaders' speeches was strikingly similar to Chien Thang's. Moreover, the speeches revealed that the party Central Committee's 20th plenum had been held "early this year," thus strongly suggesting that Chien Thang was reflecting the views of the Central Committee. This was confirmed on 10 April when Hanoi released its first substantive report of the plenum proceedings. The report, like the Chien Thang article, held that "fundamental changes" had occurred in the military situation: "We are holding the initiative and are in a victorious, advantageous, and upgrading position, whereas the enemy is in a losing, passive, difficult, and downgrading posture."

The report on the plenum also recorded its view that communist "victories" since the 1968 Tet offensive "have opened the realistic possibility of defeating the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine in Indochina." That the plenum envisaged a military defeat of Vietnamization was spelled out in an 11 April NHAN DAN editorial on the Central Committee's meeting which declared in even stronger terms: "We have the proper conditions to take the initiative in attacking the enemy, to smash the Vietnamization

* See the 29 March TRENDS, pages 8-11.

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plan and the Nixon Doctrine, and to advance toward winning great new victories and leading the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance to total victory." According to the report on the plenum, the Central Committee held that perseverance in and acceleration of the "war of resistance" is the "urgent task" of the Vietnamese at the present stage.

BACKGROUND As large-scale fighting diminished in the wake of the 1968 Tet offensive, Hanoi propaganda generally avoided discussing the importance of the role of the main-force units. But the North Vietnamese did not suggest that they could succeed without the use of these units. The necessity for attacks by large units at some point in the war was at least implicitly reaffirmed during this period--in a December 1967 article by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap which pointed out that in the course of a protracted "people's war" there will be a transition from "progressive evolution" to "developments by leaps and bounds." The implications of Giap's remarks were sharpened in an unsigned article in the January-February 1971 issue of the DRV journal TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING) which stressed that protracted warfare strategy "is not protracted guerrilla fighting" and that there must also be "sudden leap-like developments." Elsewhere, the article asserted even more pointedly that "the total defeat of the 'Vietnamization' of the war must be a [continuous] process and also will take place in large leaps which change the balance of forces to the point where the enemy does not have the capacity to continue the war."

Prior to the publication of the TUYEN HUAN article, an authoritative argument for decisive main-force attacks was presented in a December 1970 article attributed to PRG Defense Minister Tran Nam Trung, publicized in both Hanoi and Front media. In stark contrast to Vietnamese communist propaganda over the previous two years, Trung stated baldly that the stepping up of big-unit actions is "required in the development of the all-people and comprehensive people's war in order to smash the U.S. imperialists' stubborn plots and to crush their aggressive will."

It is possible that the 19th plenum--which Hanoi media first mentioned on 1 February 1971--endorsed Tran Nam Trung's apparent view that Hanoi's regular army units had to be committed to a decisive engagement with the allies. Hanoi's report on that plenum, like its report on the 20th plenum, noted that the

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Central Committee discussed the war, but it revealed little else. Comment on the 19th plenum did, however, reflect the priority North Vietnam was giving to the war. The 2 February 1971 NHAN DAN editorial, for example, asserted that "to oppose the Americans for national salvation is an urgent, sacred, and most important duty of our people."

The feasibility and desirability of confronting the allies with communist main-force units was pressed in articles by Hanoi military commentators in the spring of 1971 in the wake of Operation Lam Son 719, which Hanoi maintained had been a major strategic defeat for the ARVN. Most notable among these articles was one written by the commentator "Chien Binh" and published in the 2 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. Chien Binh held that "only by annihilating the enemy's military forces by big chunks can we gradually knock out the enemy, gradually crush his will, and gradually change the war situation in order to advance toward completely militarily defeating him." He maintained that Lam Son 719 had demonstrated that the allied forces "cannot cope" with "large-scale blows of annihilation."

The role of main-force attacks was again raised in July and early August in a spate of commentaries on the military situation during the first six months of the year. A 2 August article by Chien Thang was particularly outspoken in its stress on the impact of offensives by main-force units and their unique role in "definitely weakening" the adversary with "big battles of annihilation."

In October an article by the military commentator "Cuu Long," publicized by both Hanoi and Front media, again pressed the case for large-scale attacks. In one of the boldest rationalizations for such action, he stated flatly that "our main-force army can now completely defeat the southern puppet army." He likened the current situation to that in 1965 when, he claimed, the ARVN was nearly put out of action prior to the intervention of U.S. troops. The notion that the ARVN could be defeated was again raised at the beginning of this year in propaganda pegged to a 24 December PLAF command communique on the fighting in 1971. The communique, released on 3 January, maintained that with U.S. troops withdrawing and the ARVN "seriously disintegrating," the PLAF was "fully capable of defeating the Saigon puppet army even if it received more U.S. dollars, weapons, and air support."

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PRC CONDEMNS U.S. BOMBING, ACCLAIMS COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE

A 10 April PRC Foreign Ministry statement seconds Hanoi's statement on the 6th denouncing U.S. bombing of the DRV and "warmly" acclaims "the magnificent victories" won during the current communist offensive in South Vietnam. The Chinese statement is notable for going to considerable length to justify the DRV's war role in the South, reviving a theme that was last prominent in Chinese statements in the mid-1960's. At the same time, however, the statement avoids attacking the Nixon Administration by name and fails to reaffirm Peking's commitment of support to the war effort in Indochina. Peking's most recent previous official statement on Indochina, a 31 March foreign ministry statement supporting Vietnamese communist protests against suspension of the Paris talks, had been the first such statement in years to fail to express Chinese support for the war effort.

Apart from the foreign ministry statement, which followed Peking's invariable pattern of seconding an official DRV statement, there has been no official or elite comment by Peking on the communist offensive. Politburo alternate member Chi Teng-kuei, speaking at an 8 April banquet for a visiting Albanian delegation, referred only in passing to Indochina in praising Albania for, among other things, supporting "the three peoples of Indochina in their war against U.S. aggression." At the time of the 1968 Tet offensive, Peking had weighed in with high-level expressions of support backed by mass rallies. Thus, during the first week, Chou En-lai had sent a message to the head of the NLFV acclaiming its "exceedingly brilliant victories" and pledging the PRC's "powerful backing," and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial combined praise for the offensive with mocking jabs at President Johnson for being "panic-stricken."

Although expressing "utmost indignation" over the U.S. bombing of the DRV, the 10 April Chinese statement shows restraint in reacting to Vietnamese developments. Unlike the 31 March PRC statement, it does not attack the Nixon Administration by name, and it fails to respond to the 6 April DRV statement's call for the fraternal countries to "act resolutely" and to "struggle more powerfully" in demanding that the United States end its attacks on the DRV, end the Vietnamization policy, and respond to the PRG's seven-point peace plan. The Chinese statement, in fact, is devoid of the demands on the United States that have been included in all other recent statements.

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The main thrust of the statement, accounting for almost half of its length, is directed at the argument--attributed to "the U.S. Government"--that the U.S. attacks on North Vietnam are in response to an invasion of the South. Rejecting this argument as "ridiculous and absurd to the extreme," the statement all but directly acknowledges the North Vietnamese role in the offensive in the course of justifying Hanoi's actions. Asserting flatly that "South and North Vietnam is one country," the statement insists that since the "Vietnamese nation is a whole" it is "fully legitimate and a matter of course for the Vietnamese compatriots in the northern and southern parts of the country to support each other and jointly combat the aggressors." U.S. military threats, the statement declares, cannot prevent "the people in North Vietnam from fulfilling their sacred duty of supporting their blood-sealed compatriots in the South."

The issue of North Vietnamese involvement in the war in the South had figured prominently in Chinese pronouncements in the mid-1960's reacting to the escalating hostilities. The Chinese argued at that time that U.S. actions had erased the demarcation line dividing Vietnam that had been established in the 1954 Geneva settlement. According to this argument, the DRV, China, and other countries were thereby free of any restrictions in offering support and aid to the war effort. In stressing this issue now,* but without reaffirming its commitment of support for the war, Peking may be particularly concerned to portray developments in Vietnam as an internal matter and to play down the interests of outside powers. One motive for this approach might be to limit the impact of these developments on Sino-U.S. relations.** Another consideration might relate to the

* Peking made a passing reference to this issue in a party-government statement of 13 December 1970 supporting a DRV party-government appeal to carry on the war. The Chinese statement said the "Vietnamese nation is an integral whole, and it is the sacred duty of the people in the northern part of Vietnam to support and assist their kinsmen in the South." The current Chinese statement's assertion that "South and North Vietnam is one country" represents the sharpest formulation of this line yet made by Peking.

** In the Sino-U.S. joint communique of 28 February, Peking had softened its standard formulation of support for the Indochinese "war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation" to one of support for the Indochinese "efforts for the attainment of their goal."

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central role played by Soviet weaponry in the communist offensive, a role which puts Peking at a disadvantage in its competition with the Soviets for influence in Vietnam. It may be revealing in this connection that NCNA's account of the recent VWP plenum, based on VNA's report, omitted the claim that Hanoi had successfully won "the ever greater sympathy, support, and assistance of the fraternal socialist countries."

OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM In acclaiming the "magnificent victories" won by the Vietnamese comrades, the foreign ministry statement assesses the "vehement offensive on various battlefields" in South Vietnam as dealing "a heavy blow" at the Vietnamization program. The statement mentions no other objective of the offensive and alludes to political issues only in expressing confidence that the Vietnamese will frustrate all "political schemes of U.S. imperialism."

Apart from the foreign ministry statement, the only authoritative Chinese comment on the offensive has been a 6 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which also hailed the offensive as a heavy blow to Vietnamization. Mentioning only the Quang Tri-Thua Thien area, Commentator expressed approval of the offensive as demonstrating "the mighty power of people's war" and contributing "to the three Indochinese peoples' joint struggle." In contrast to the 31 March and 10 April foreign ministry statements, the Commentator article reaffirmed Peking's backing for the war as "the bounden proletarian internationalist duty" of the Chinese people. "So long as the Vietnamese people fight to the end," Commentator declared, "the Chinese people will support them to the end."

Since a 4 April NCNA report based on Western news accounts, all of Peking's coverage of the military situation in South Vietnam has consisted of pickups of Vietnamese communist sources. Typical of these reports was one carried by NCNA on the 10th and attributed to LPA which praised the attacks in Binh Long Province from 5 to 7 April. NCNA ended its account by citing a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary as portraying "a large-scale battle of annihilation" in Binh Long that demonstrated "the strength of a closely coordinated offensive" and an "ability to fight large-scale battles of annihilation."

In addition to these battle reports, Peking has also been carrying the texts of official statements by the DRV and the PRG. But Chinese reservations about the offensive, evident in Peking's failure to initiate high-level expressions of support (the

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foreign ministry statement being a routine seconding statement), also seem reflected in a reluctance to endorse the objectives of the offensive beyond that of dealing a blow to Vietnamization. NCNA's account of the VWP plenum report noted the claim that victories since 1968 have inflicted "an important failure" on the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine, but it omitted the more ambitious claim that these victories have "opened the realistic possibility of defeating" Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine.

NCNA's own reports on Vietnam developments have been devoted to U.S. actions and statements. NCNA reports on 7 and 10 April took note of military moves and statements made by the United States, including Secretary Laird's news conference on the 7th, in connection with the expanded deployment of U.S. air and naval forces in Vietnam. Like the foreign ministry statement, NCNA took issue with U.S. assertions that the communist offensive represents an invasion by the DRV and violates the 1954 agreements. The report on the 7th cited three U.S. presidential candidates--Humphrey, Jackson, and Wallace--as well as Senator Goldwater as supporting the use of U.S. air power in Vietnam, thus giving the impression of bipartisan support for the Administration's moves. Another NCNA report, on the 11th, took particular note of what it described as "indiscriminate bombing" of Vinh and referred to the use of B-52's over the DRV. Peking has not referred to U.S. domestic opposition to American actions in Vietnam.

In a gesture of solidarity with the DRV, Peking announced on the 9th that a documentary film on Pham Van Dong's visit to the PRC last November would be shown beginning on the 10th. Observing that the film is "permeated with warm feelings of great friendship and militant unity" between the DRV and China, NCNA said that the 700 million Chinese people provide "a powerful backing" for the Vietnamese and that China's territory is "their reliable rear area." These pledges have not yet appeared in Peking's comment on current developments in Vietnam.

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MOSCOW REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE, U.S. ACTIONS

Moscow has sustained its cautious approach to the latest developments in Vietnam. Limiting itself chiefly to reportorial coverage, it has studiously avoided any mention of the USSR's role in providing military support to the DRV while evincing sensitivity to the possible impact on U.S.-Soviet relations, with President Nixon's Moscow visit in the offing.

The Soviet Union has yet to issue an official statement on the recent U.S. military actions. But the first elite reference to Soviet aid in the context of the current offensive and the first demand at the leadership level for an end to the U.S. bombing of the North came in remarks by Brezhnev when, according to Radio Moscow, he received the DRV Ambassador and had "an exchange of opinions" with him in an atmosphere of "friendship and cordiality."* Reporting the meeting the day it took place, Moscow said Brezhnev extended wishes for "further success in defense of the freedom and independence of the motherland and the construction of socialism." Declaring that the Soviet party, government, and people "unswervingly follow the course of solidarity with Vietnam and with the patriots of Indochina," he added that they will "continue to give them assistance and support." Notably, the report of Brezhnev's remarks made no mention of the war in the South. It quoted the Soviet leader only as condemning "U.S. aggression in Indochina" and as demanding "an immediate end to the bombing of the DRV."

Kosygin had used the occasion of a 7 April speech in Iraq to express "warm, fraternal solidarity" with the Vietnamese people but made no reference to recent developments. More explicitly, a Soviet-GDR communique on SED party chief Honecker's 4-10 April

* By contrast, reporting on 11 February that Kosygin had received the DRV ambassador at the latter's request, TASS said their talk on "questions of mutual interest" passed in an atmosphere of friendship and "comradely frankness"--a euphemism for substantive differences. That meeting was reported some two hours before the Soviet Government belatedly came out with a statement assailing the eight-point U.S. peace plan disclosed by the President on 25 January and backing the 2 February PRG statement that rejected the U.S. plan and "elaborated" on the PRG's own seven points.

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visit to Moscow, as reported by Radio Moscow, expressed "fraternal solidarity" with the DRV as well as "concern in connection with the expansion of U.S. aggression in Indochina that has taken place recently." Noting that the United States had renewed its bombing of the DRV after the boycott of the Paris talks, the communique registered both sides' "decisive condemnation of these aggressive acts" but rendered no pledge of support for the DRV.

Soviet sensitivity over the repercussions Hanoi's new offensive could have on Soviet-American relations was evident in TASS' account of Defense Secretary Laird's 7 April press conference: The account contained no reflection of Laird's charge that the Soviet Union has been a major contributor to the war by virtue of its failure to restrain Hanoi. Soviet media also ignored State Department press spokesman McCloskey's 4 April press conference, which included the remark that the North Vietnamese are largely supported by heavy Soviet military equipment. And Moscow's account of the Washington ceremony for signing of the convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons suppressed the fact that President Nixon spoke, thereby avoiding the problem of how to treat his implied criticism of the Soviet support for Hanoi.

TASS' report of Secretary Laird's press conference characterized his remarks as an attempt to "blackmail" the DRV by threatening a continuation of the bombing "until it displays readiness to conduct talks in Paris seriously, on terms set forth by Washington." But TASS obscured the thrust of the secretary's remarks by neglecting to mention his charge that the North Vietnamese actions constitute an invasion and a violation of the DMZ that sets aside the 1968 understanding under which bombing of the North was halted, nor did it report his warning that the bombing of the North will continue until the North Vietnamese pull back their forces.

TREATMENT OF
DRV STATEMENTS

Moscow's cautious treatment of the Vietnam developments and of President Nixon personally was underscored in its handling of the 6 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement and of the DRV Government statement of the 11th. TASS versions of both statements deleted all personal references to President Nixon and obscured Hanoi's definition of the goals of the war. Where the DRV Foreign Ministry statement says "world public opinion demands that the Nixon Administration immediately end

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the war of aggression," the TASS version reads: "World public opinion demands the immediate end of the war of aggression." And where the DRV statement specifically affirms the Vietnamese people's resolve to "struggle tenaciously, to step up their war of resistance and to struggle until the collapse of the puppet regime and armed forces in order to liberate the South, build socialism in the North and thus advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland," the TASS version reads: "The Vietnamese people are determined to fight tenaciously, to step up their war of resistance." In the same pattern of restraint, the 11 April TASS account of the DRV Government statement deletes four personal references to President Nixon and similarly obscures the goals of the war as enunciated by Hanoi.

Where the DRV Foreign Ministry statement calls on the fraternal socialist countries to "act resolutely and timely to check the new" U.S. actions, the TASS account waters this down to a plea for the fraternal countries "to condemn the U.S. imperialists' new military ventures." TASS' account of the DRV Government statement entirely omits its call for the socialist countries to take "timely action" and its added appeal for "even stronger support and assistance." The account of the government statement also sanitizes that document's allegation that Secretary Laird "said there was no limitation on the bombing of the North and threatened to attack Haiphong harbor." TASS' version reads: "The United States Defense Secretary Laird, the statement says, has cynically announced that the United States will intensify blows at North Vietnam."

SOVIET COMMENT Moscow's first comment on the use of B-52's and U.S. naval shelling of the North came on 11 April shortly after the release of the DRV Government statement. On his own authority, TASS commentator Vasily Kharkov described the U.S. military moves as "an extremely grave step" designed to "save Vietnamization." But he cited the DRV Government statement for the specific charge that the U.S. acts constitute "a violation of international law, a cynical trampling on the 1968 commitment about the unconditional cessation of the bombings and shelling of the DRV" Asserting that the world public supports the DRV, Kharkov concluded with a generalized reaffirmation of Soviet support: "The Soviet people, who regard help to embattled Vietnam as their internationalist duty, will fulfill it to the end. The American aggressors ought to know better, for reckless adventures will inevitably be avenged."

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Earlier Soviet comment included a PRAVDA article by Skvortsov on the 8th which said that "the Pentagon's" expansion of the fighting and the American withdrawal from the Paris talks were twin actions representing an effort by the United States to "impose its will on the Vietnamese people." Skvortsov added that "the people in Washington should at long last rid themselves of the illusion that it is possible to intimidate the Vietnamese people." An article in RED STAR by Leontyev on the 9th portrayed "the broad advance of the patriots in South Vietnam" as another "blow struck at the policy of Vietnamization," but Leontyev stopped short of claiming that victory could be achieved on the battlefield: "Today it has been proved again that it is not the notorious Vietnamization, but only negotiations that can bring peace to Vietnam."

DRV EMBASSY MEETING The USSR's reticence about its military support role in Vietnam at this delicate juncture in U.S.-Soviet relations was pointed up by its failure to publicize a meeting at the DRV Embassy in Moscow on 5 April which Hanoi said was attended by Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Batitskiy. The Hanoi domestic service, Hanoi broadcasts to South Vietnam, and Hanoi's Mandarin service made use of an LPA Moscow correspondent's account of the meeting to underscore Soviet support for the DRV. Noting that Batitskiy had headed the Soviet military delegation which recently visited North Vietnam, the account quoted him as stating that "the new victories scored by the armymen and civilians of Quang Tri and Thua Thien as well as in Cambodia and Laos indicate the might of the Liberation Armed Forces and are a heavy blow to the U.S. imperialists' Vietnamization policy." Batitskiy added, the account said, that "the Soviet armymen and civilians will do their best to fulfill their international obligation of supporting the Vietnamese people and rendering support for the PRG's seven-point proposal."

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CAMBODIA/ COMMUNISTS CLAIM THEIR FORCES THREATEN PHNOM PENH

In the wake of the severe communist shelling and attacks in and around Phnom Penh on the night of 20-21 March, the media of Sihanouk's Front (FUNK) have focused attention on the need to "liberate" major Cambodian cities--including Phnom Penh--and have sought to lend substance to this objective with the announcement of the appointment of a "FUNK Committee of Phnom Penh." On 24 March AKI, the agency of Sihanouk's Front, publicized a communique from the FUNK's political bureau and the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (RGNU), dated the 23d, which announced the composition of the Phnom Penh committee, headed by Norodom Phurissara, a cousin of Sihanouk, Phurissara was reported in January to have come to the "liberated zone." The decision on the composition of the seven-man committee was said to have been made at a joint session of the FUNK and RGNU, in accordance with a proposal by Khieu Samphan, a FUNK political bureau member, RGNU vice premier and defense minister, and the army (CPNLAF) commander in chief.

Also on the 24th, a FUNK radio broadcast highlighting the 20-21 March attacks on Phnom Penh called upon residents of the capital to "rise up and seize power." Maintaining that the CPNLAF had been "launching powerful offensives without letup on many other fronts" and that "in the future the CPNLAF will intensify their activities on all battlefields, especially Phnom Penh," the broadcast urged: "Therefore, the population of Phnom Penh should rise up unitedly to strike and demonstrate to overthrow the Phnom Penh traitorous clique and recapture power."

Khieu Samphan in his role as CPNLAF Commander in Chief echoed the radio's claims about the war situation in an appeal to his soldiers--dated 24 March and broadcast by the FUNK radio on the 28th--in which he praised the attacks on Phnom Penh and said that they had "dealt stunning blows to the shaky enemy leadership apparatus." Holding that "at present the whole country is launching offensives against the enemy in all fields--military, political, economic, and psychological," he asserted: "We should ceaselessly intensify attacks against the enemy everywhere, around and inside Phnom Penh" In listing actions to be taken, he noted that "people's power" should be established in and around the capital.

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AKI on 1 April carried another appeal, dated the 24th, from a trade union leader, Nguon Eng, who was among those appointed to the FUNK's new committee for Phnom Penh. This appeal called upon the workers - "especially in Phnom Penh" - to stage strikes and to cooperate with other groups to organize demonstrations and "rise up in insurrection to overthrow the traitors' administration and take power in your own hands." In concluding his appeal, Nguon Eng stated: "The time has come. The CPNLAF have unleashed their general offensive." On 3 April, AKI carried an appeal from the FUNK's Phnom Penh committee, addressed to the citizens of the capital, which echoed the view that the army was attacking everywhere and encircling the capital. It urged Phnom Penh residents to coordinate their efforts with the CPNLAF to overthrow the government and "liberate" the capital.

Also on the 3d, the FUNK radio broadcast a commentary which labeled recent fighting "a nationwide general offensive" and claimed that the CPNLAF was directing its attacks at "a number of big cities, including Phnom Penh." Offering instructions for residents of the capital who chose not to leave, the broadcast urged them to stay away from locations which might be subject to attacks. In conclusion, it warned that the capital was completely encircled and the regime's "doomday" was drawing near. (While the concentration of attention on the threat to Phnom Penh in recent propaganda is unusual, equally frenzied warnings have been voiced in the past. Thus, for example, a 10 December broadcast by the FUNK radio predicted in similar terms that the "doomday" of the Lon Nol regime was drawing near and maintained that "our forces have arrived at the gates of Phnom Penh" and have surrounded several other cities.*)

The 3 April radio commentary echoed earlier propaganda in referring to the CPNLAF's determination to "liberate" Siem Reap, Kompong Thom, and Prey Veng. The intention to "liberate" Kompong Thom was voiced in an appeal from the CPNLAF command in the area, publicized by AKI on 29 February. A similar appeal pertaining to Siem Reap was publicized by the news agency on 14 March.** And on 2 April, AKI carried a 25 March appeal from the CPNLAF command on the Prey Veng front which pledged to "liberate" the province and city of Prey Veng.

* The 10 December broadcast was discussed in the 15 December TRENDS, page 15.

** The appeals on Kompong Thom and Siem Reap were discussed, respectively, in the 8 March TRENDS, page 23, and the 15 March TRENDS, page 11.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PEKING MAINTAINS FIRM LINE ON SOVIET "HEGEMONISTIC" AIMS

While the intense Sino-Soviet polemical exchanges triggered by the Indian-Pakistan conflict have subsided to earlier levels, Peking has indicated that it is in no mood to respond favorably to the conciliatory gesture toward the Chinese made by Brezhnev in the CPSU chief's major foreign policy statement on 20 March.* Brezhnev's speech, in which he expressed Soviet readiness to base relations with the PRC on the principles of peaceful coexistence and to conclude a nonaggression agreement, coincided with the return to Peking of the chief Soviet negotiator at the border talks after a three-month absence. Unlike Moscow, Peking has not mentioned Ilchev's return. Significantly, Peking chose to publicize promptly on the next day the fact that the session of the Sino-Soviet border river navigation commission held from 6 December to 21 March had failed to reach an agreement. Moscow has remained silent on this development.

Consistent with its avoidance of commentary on President Nixon's visit, Peking has not reacted directly to Moscow's criticism of the Sino-U.S. summit, but Peking's attacks on Soviet policy and its moves vis-a-vis the two superpowers reflect its position within the triangular relationship. Peking's sense of the global power realities was most vividly demonstrated during the South Asian crisis when the Chinese sharply accused the Soviets of expansionist ambitions, including a charge made by the Chinese representative at the Security Council that one of the Soviet aims was to encircle China. Peking's responses to other developments--such as Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan a month before the President's trip to the PRC, and a seemingly innocuous recent Soviet news report on the Taiwan elections--have evidently been shaped by the triangular context.

During the President's visit, which produced a communique in which the two sides pledged not to seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and to oppose efforts by others to do so, Peking

* Brezhnev's remarks on China are discussed in the TRENDS of 22 March, pages 8-11.

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made a gesture to Moscow by reporting for the first time in recent years that Chinese officials in Manchurian cities had placed wreaths in honor of Soviet Armed Forces Day at memorials for Soviet soldiers who fell in China during World War II. Moscow chose to ignore this gesture, complaining rather that Soviet diplomats on this occasion, as in recent years, were refused permission to lay wreaths at the memorials in Northeast China.

GROMYKO IN JAPAN

Gromyko's visit to Japan from 23 to 28 January prompted a Chinese response which in effect assessed the visit as reactive to the new fluidity in Asian affairs imparted by Peking's invitation to President Nixon. According to a lengthy NCNA account on 3 February, Gromyko's trip was "an important step" taken by the Soviets to step up collusion with Tokyo and "to contend with U.S. imperialism for spheres of influence in Asia." After taking note of the central place held by the China question in the Soviet-Japanese talks, NCNA said that Gromyko had "hurried to Japan to woo it at this juncture" in order "to expand the positions of Soviet revisionism in Asia." NCNA also noted in this context that U.S.-Japanese relations became strained in the second half of 1971, but it mentioned only Washington's new economic policy as a factor while leaving Peking's invitation to President Nixon implicit between the lines.

NCNA probed a sore point in Soviet-Japanese relations by discussing the northern territories question, in the process indicating that Peking regards the four disputed Kurile islands as belonging to Japan. Alluding to the Sino-Soviet border dispute, NCNA cited the Japanese press as pointing out that the Soviet Union "also occupies the territories of other countries in Europe and Asia" and is "afraid of giving rise to 'a chain reaction' if the 'northern territory' is returned to Japan."

TAIWAN

The NCNA account of Gromyko's Japan visit, in accusing the Soviets and Japanese of colluding against the Chinese, included the charge that Moscow "has recently abetted the Japanese Government in occupying by force" China's Taiwan. The charge of Soviet maneuvering on the Taiwan question was formulated in even sharper terms in a 25 March NCNA denunciation of a brief Soviet news report on the recent ROC elections. The basic thrust of the attack was similar to a previous criticism of the Soviets on 9 January 1970 for flirting with Taipei representatives. However, differences in the treatment of

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the United States reflect the improvement in Sino-U.S. relations and underscore the persisting Sino-Soviet tensions. Reviewing past charges against Moscow on the Taiwan question, the 25 March NCNA report recalled that the Soviets had seized the opportunity of Vice President Agnew's "tour of Asia" in 1969 to refer to Taiwan as a state. In contrast to this neutral description of the Agnew trip, an official Chinese protest to Moscow on 9 January 1970 had referred to the Vice President's "butting into Asia to carry out criminal activities" and charged that the Soviets were contributing to "the U.S. imperialist plot" of promoting two Chinas.

The 25 March NCNA attack may have been responsive to an announcement two weeks earlier by the ROC foreign minister that Taipei, in the wake of President Nixon's visit to the mainland, would seek trade and other ties with the Soviet bloc countries. Coming after Brezhnev's major speech and Illichev's return to Peking, the attack also served to underscore Chinese suspicions of Soviet moves. The ostensible target of the attack, a five-sentence news item in the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES (No. 12) reporting the renomination of Chiang Kai-shek as ROC president, was found objectionable for referring to the Kuomintang as "the ruling party in Taiwan" and to Chiang as the Kuomintang director-general. NCNA saw "ulterior motives" lurking behind the fact that NEW TIMES quoted from a Western news report the chant by Kuomintang officials of "Long Live the Director-General." What NCNA neglected to mention is that NEW TIMES also quoted unnamed commentators as recalling that on 20 February, "the day before President Nixon arrived in Peking," Chiang told the National Assembly in Taipei that he wished to step down in favor of "a new person of virtue and integrity."

The NCNA account, citing Moscow's allegedly favorable treatment of the Chiang regime in past years and increasing contacts between Soviet and ROC representatives, pointedly observed that "especially" since 1969 the Soviets have stepped up their "flirtation" with the ROC. "One cannot help suspecting," NCNA said, that Moscow "is attempting to take a hand in the conspiratorial activities of creating 'two Chinas.'" NCNA concluded by warning the Soviets not to pursue their flirtation with Taipei, saying the Chinese "shall wait and see how far the Soviet revisionist leading clique will go down this road of hostility against the Chinese people."

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SUPERPOWER RIVALRY

Apart from these polemical matters pegged to specific provocations, Peking has pressed its anti-Soviet line largely in the name of opposition by the third world and "medium and small nations" to the "power and hegemony practiced by the superpowers." Thus, rather than to picture Moscow's moves as directed against China in particular, most of Peking's comment has been designed to underscore its common interests with other countries resentful of superpower dominance. Significantly, Peking's variations on the theme of superpower "contention and collusion" have been heavily weighted to stressing contentious elements in Soviet-U.S. relations, thereby justifying flexible maneuvering by Peking within the triangular relationship.

Peking's approach has been illustrated recently on the occasion of visits by delegations coming from areas of superpower rivalry. At the time of the visit in March of Egyptian foreign affairs advisor Riyad, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on 23 March declared that one of the reasons why the Middle East question, "a major question closely linked with the anti-imperialist struggle" throughout the world, remains unsettled is that "one or two superpowers seek hegemony and contend for spheres of influence." Expressing Chinese support for the Arab struggle against Israel, Li condemned the superpowers for "subjecting Arab countries to their aggression, subversion, control, and interference" and for "their conspiracy to divide spheres of influence." Three days later, Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei lectured the Egyptians on not becoming dependent on the Soviets, insisting that every country should pursue a policy of "maintaining independence and of relying mainly on its own strength and regarding foreign assistance as supplementary."

These themes were also aired by the Chinese during the visit of Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff shortly after the signing of a new agreement continuing the British bases on Malta. Chou En-lai, speaking at a 2 April banquet for the visitors, pledged support for Malta's effort to "consolidate national independence" and "develop a self-contained economy devoted to peace." Declaring that the superpowers are "contending for spheres of influence everywhere in the world, from land to the seas and the oceans," Chou expressed sympathy for the "many" Mediterranean countries that have evinced "grave concern over the increasing tension created by the superpowers contending for hegemony" in that area.

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On 8 April, the day of the Maltese delegation's departure from the PRC, PEOPLE'S DAILY carried an article entitled "Oppose the Scramble for Hegemony in the Mediterranean Between the Superpowers" which elaborated on the theme of Soviet-U.S. rivalry in the Mediterranean. The article charged that the "increasingly acute contention" between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean "has seriously impaired the independence and sovereignty of the countries along its coast, aggravated the tension in the Middle East and the Mediterranean area, and aroused grave concern and strong opposition from the Mediterranean countries." PEOPLE'S DAILY closed by expressing Chinese support for the struggle against the superpower "scramble for hegemony" in the area.

Peking has had recourse to the proxy of its Albanian allies to raise more sensitive issues involving Moscow's relations within the communist world. An NCNA dispatch datelined Tirana on 7 April summarized an article in the Albanian party daily on 1 April denouncing the "Brezhnevian" doctrine of limited sovereignty of communist countries. NCNA quoted the article as saying the Soviets for years have been manipulating the German question, "unscrupulously sacrificing" the GDR's national interests for the sake of their "bargainings with West German imperialism." In this connection the article was quoted as citing the Berlin agreement as "flagrantly" violating GDR sovereignty. NCNA also quoted the article as charging that the "Soviet social imperialists, besides openly occupying Czechoslovakia, have sent their troops into and silently occupied" the GDR, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and--coming closer home to the Chinese--Mongolia. Touching another sensitive matter, the NCNA account cited the article's conclusion that "the relations of limited sovereignty cannot fail to arouse the indignation and revolt" of the peoples subjugated by the Soviets.

ATTACKS ON BREZHNEV Though Peking continues to show restraint in not pursuing the strident ideological vendetta against Moscow that embittered Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960's, recent articles in the theoretical journal RED FLAG have contained personal jabs at Brezhnev as a representative deviationist in the history of the communist movement. An article in RED FLAG No. 3, whose title--"Be Open and Aboveboard, and Do Not Intrigue and Conspire"--clearly relates it to the Lin Biao affair, cited Brezhnev and Khrushchev as examples of leaders who engaged in intrigues and conspiracies. According to the article, Brezhnev used these methods to expel his predecessor, "carry out Khrushchevism without Khrushchev, and become the

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ambitious new war of the present era." The article did not, however, refer to Soviet designs against China. Significantly, in running through the rogues' gallery of "windlorn" in Chinese communist history, the article did not include the charge of "illicit relations with foreign countries." This charge has frequently appeared in comment related to the Lin Piao purge, most notably in the authoritative 1 December joint editorial on strengthening party leadership.*

Brezhnev was also named in a list of renegades in the communist movement discussed in an article in RED FLAG No. 4 calling for the study of world history. The article called for study of what it termed the close relationship between modern world history, contemporary world history, and the history of the world communist movement, on the one hand, and the current class struggle on the other. Striking a note that became prominent after the announcement of Peking's invitation to President Nixon, the article characterized the present situation as one of "global upheaval," a "crucial turning point" in which the Chinese "must be prepared to wage a great struggle different from the struggles in the past." In short, the article's injunctions represent still another effort to orient the Chinese along the lines of flexible, Chouist policy directions in the world arena.

* A Szechwan broadcast on 15 March recited a charge against Mao's former rival Chang Kuo-tao--an appropriate surrogate for attacks on Lin Piao--that could be read as linking Lin's purge to disputes over Peking's stance toward the Soviet Union and the United States. Recalling a dispute that was resolved at the pivotal Tsunyi conference in 1935, the broadcast said Chang opposed Mao's line of "marching north to resist Japan." Read in the current context, this might be interpreted as a charge that Lin opposed the unremitting confrontation with the Soviet Union at a time of improved Sino-U.S. relations. On the other hand, the charge against Chang is an important part of the communist historical record that could be expected to appear in a detailed denunciation such as the Szechwan broadcast contained. The broadcast did not include the charge of illicit foreign connections.

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USSR - IRAQ

KOSYGIN VISIT PRODUCES SECOND SOVIET-ARAB FRIENDSHIP PACT

The treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in Baghdad on 9 April, during the 6-10 April "official friendly visit" of a Soviet party-government delegation led by Kosygin, is modeled largely on the Soviet-Egyptian treaty signed last May but diverges from it on some counts--notably including a weaker article on military cooperation. The conclusion of the treaty was foreshadowed in the communique on the February USSR visit of an Iraqi delegation led by Ba'th Regional Command Deputy Secretary and Revolution Command Council Deputy Chairman Saddam Husayn.

The stated occasion for Kosygin's trip was the inauguration of the Northern ar-Rumaylah oilfield; his delegation included the Soviet minister for the oil industry. The Soviet deputy minister for the gas industry, also in Iraq for the ceremony, was reported by Baghdad as announcing that the first Soviet tanker would begin loading ar-Rumaylah oil for transport to the Soviet Union. Moscow propaganda surrounding the visit has played up what is termed an Iraqi victory over the "monopoly of the Western oil kings" with the establishment of a national petroleum industry and commissioning of the first major national oilfield, developed with Soviet technical and economic aid.* Speaking at the commissioning ceremony, Kosygin rejected "fairy tales" spread by the "capitalist oil companies" to the effect that the Arabs are unable to manage their own economies. If Iraq and other Arab countries do not now possess enough experts and technicians, he added, they soon will have them with the help of the socialist countries.

* Peking has indirectly attacked Moscow on the oil question, NCNA on the 11th citing a Kuwaiti paper as declaring that the Soviet leaders are opposed to the idea of the Arab countries using their oil as a weapon against Israel and "imperialism." The paper claimed that an "Arab leader" recently visiting Moscow was told that Arab oil is actually "international property."

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The commissioning of the oilfield coincided with celebrations of the 25th anniversary of the ruling Ba'th Party--an event Soviet media generally sought to divorce from Kosygin's visit, presumably so as not to appear to be giving it greater attention than the Syrian Ba'th Party's celebration of the same event. Separate CPSU delegations were sent to Damascus and Baghdad expressly for the respective Ba'th anniversary festivities.* Where Baghdad accounts of Kosygin's visit stressed the double celebration of the party's jubilee anniversary and the start of national oil production, Moscow's focused on the latter event. On 9 April, however, reviewing Kosygin's visit, TASS did note various activities commemorating the Ba'th anniversary, including a reception attended by Kosygin; and both the communique on the visit and Kosygin's departure cable to the Iraqi leaders took due note of the anniversary.

There were no reports of speeches at a dinner given by President al-Bakr for Kosygin on 6 April or at a luncheon given by Saddam Husayn and a reception hosted by Kosygin on the 9th. But speeches were made by Kosygin and Saddam Husayn at the oilfield inauguration on 7 April and by Kosygin and al-Bakr at the treaty signing ceremony on the 9th. Kosygin had preliminary separate meetings with Saddam Husayn and al-Bakr on the day of his arrival, and formal talks were held on the 8th--preceded, according to the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, by a 90-minute private session between Kosygin and Saddam Husayn.

SOVIET-IRAQI TREATY The 15-year friendship and cooperation treaty generally parallels the one concluded between Egypt and the USSR last May, with some additions and omissions. Two elements in the Iraqi treaty that are not present in the Egyptian one have precedents in the Soviet treaty signed with India last August--the phrase in Article 10 pledging that neither party will allow its territory to be used for any action that might cause military harm to the other, and the stipulation in Article 13 that any differences in interpretation of provisions of the treaty shall be resolved between the two sides in a spirit of "friendship, understanding, and mutual respect."**

* Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, the GDR, Yugoslavia, and the DPRK also reportedly sent delegations to both Baghdad and Damascus for the anniversary.

** The Soviet treaties with Egypt and India are discussed, respectively, in the 3 June 1971 TRENDS, pages 11-14, and the 11 August 1971 TRENDS, pages 26-30.

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Article 7 on regular consultations adds to the Egyptian version a reference to developing Iraqi-Soviet "political cooperation." And where the USSR and Egypt agreed to consult only on international issues, the USSR and Iraq agree to consult also "on questions of further developing bilateral relations." A provision for contacts in the event of a threat to peace--part of Article 7 in the Egyptian treaty--becomes a separate article in the Iraqi document. This, along with Article 13, accounts for the total of 14 articles in the Iraqi treaty as compared with 12 in the Egyptian.

Article 9 on military cooperation, much briefer than the one in the Egyptian treaty, says merely that the two countries, for the sake of their mutual security, will "continue to develop cooperation in the field of strengthening the defense capabilities of each." What contribution Iraq might make to Soviet defense and security is unclear, but the article could conceivably relate to naval facilities for the Soviet fleet in the Persian Gulf. (TASS announced on the 9th a forthcoming "official friendly visit" by a Soviet naval squadron to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr under "an understanding reached earlier.") The Egyptian treaty, in contrast, provides for continuing cooperation in the "military field" on the basis of appropriate agreements to strengthen Egypt's "defense capacity," and spells out some elements of this cooperation.

In line with Iraq's rejection of the November 1967 Security Council resolution, Article 3 omits a paragraph contained in the counterpart article of the Egyptian treaty on mutual efforts to achieve a lasting and fair peace in the Middle East in harmony with the aims and principles of the UN Charter.

Although Iraq is drawing on Soviet expertise in developing its oil resources, Article 2 goes beyond the Egyptian version in adding that the signatories will respect "each other's sovereignty over all natural resources." The same article fails to describe Iraq as trying to "reconstruct society along socialist lines," a phrase applied to Egypt in the Cairo treaty.

The preamble registers Moscow's concern over Arab unity in a new passage, not present in the earlier treaty, expressing the two sides' conviction that "further cohesion of all forces of peace and progress, including the consolidation of the unity of the Arab states" on an anti-imperialist basis, is important in the struggle for world peace and security.

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It was presumably also at Moscow's behest that another new paragraph in the preamble expresses the conviction that international problems "must be solved through cooperation and by seeking solutions acceptable to the parties concerned." References to "Zionism" in the preamble and in Article 4, on the other hand, appear to be at Iraq's behest: The Egyptian treaty nowhere mentions Zionism and alludes to Israel only indirectly in a passage on Egypt's "eliminating the consequences of aggression."

Extolling the treaty in a speech at the signing ceremony, Kosygin emphasized that it "is not directed against any other country" and "does not infringe on anybody's legitimate interests." These remarks may have been intended in part as assurance to Iran, but Kosygin clearly also had other Arab countries in mind: He went on to assert "our deep conviction" that the treaty is compatible with the interests of wide international cooperation, "including the cooperation of the Soviet Union and Iraq with other Arab countries."

Moscow broadcasts in Arabic have sought to persuade other Arab countries that they will themselves benefit from strengthened Soviet-Iraqi relations. A commentary on the 7th said Kosygin's visit "should find" an "extensive, positive reaction" on the part of all friends of Iraq. And a broadcast on the 11th, praising the Iraqi treaty and the "companion" Egyptian one, argued that Iraq could now contribute even more to the general Arab struggle.

Arab reaction to the treaty has been less than enthusiastic. Rounding up world press approbation of the treaty on the 11th, TASS found only two Arab papers to cite, and one of them--Cairo's AL-AHRAM--dealt with the communique on Kosygin's visit, not the treaty. Egypt's reaction had been conveyed in terse reportorial coverage; and a brief Cairo radio item on the 9th, one of only four on the subject, pointedly represented the treaty as banning the use of either country's territory for "provocation or ideological sabotage" against the other. Monitored Damascus media have not mentioned the Kosygin visit at all, although Damascus radio did report the Bulgarian defense minister's earlier visit to Baghdad and Podgornyy's current visit to Turkey. Libya's cool reaction was conveyed officially in a prompt Foreign and Unity Ministry statement on the 9th expressing "strong anxiety."

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JOINT COMMUNIQUE The 10 April communique on Kosygin's visit sums up the talks held "in an atmosphere of friendship, frankness, and mutual understanding." The two sides are said to have discussed questions of bilateral relations and to have "exchanged opinions" on international problems, on which their positions were "identical or similar." Where international issues were covered in the 17 February communique on Saddam Husayn's Moscow visit, this one deals specifically only with the Middle East, repeating from the February communique a paragraph asserting a shared belief that a just and durable peace cannot be established without the "liberation of all" occupied territories and protection of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs.

The communique touches on party relations in a single sentence, noting agreement that successful development of such relations is an important means of strengthening Iraqi friendship and cooperation. It was to further strengthen these relations, the communique notes, that the two sides concluded the treaty which among other things contributes to the joint struggle against "imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism." Expressing "complete satisfaction" with the level of relations achieved, both sides reaffirm a resolve to continue developing ties in the "political, economic, defense" and other fields. The communique also records Iraq's gratitude for Soviet assistance in developing the Iraqi economy, particularly with regard to the national oil industry.

UNITY PROJECT In taking note of Iraq's unity project with Egypt and Syria, the communique broaches a subject Moscow media had all but ignored since Baghdad's 15 February proposal in the wake of King Husayn's announced plan for a federated Jordan. Soviet acknowledgment of the concept in the communique still falls far short of an endorsement: In light of Saddam Husayn's recent visits to "the friendly fraternal countries" of Egypt and Syria, the communique says, "the Iraqi side set out its recent steps toward Arab unity in the interests of countering the intrigues of imperialism and its agents in the area."* The Soviet side

* In what is apparently the only acknowledgment of the Iraqi delegation's late March talks in Damascus and Cairo, a Kudryavtsev article in NOVOYE VREMYA (No. 14, 1 April) noted that in mid-March the Iraqi Government had submitted a proposal on the formation "of an alliance in some form" among Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and that "this scheme was discussed in Damascus, to which an Iraqi delegation came; it then went to Cairo." An Aleksandrov domestic service commentary on 9 April remarked in passing that the Iraqi Government "suggested to Egypt and Syria the establishment of unity of the three states."

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In turn simply "highly assesses the efforts to strengthen unity of the Arab countries on the progressive, anti-imperialist, and anti-Zionist basis" and welcomes "the steps of the leaders of Iraq and other progressive Arab countries in this direction."

A shade more positively but still cautiously, Kosygin in his ar-Rumaylah speech "warmly welcomed" the "important political moves by a number of Arab governments, including the Iraqi Government--moves aimed at strengthening solidarity among the Arab countries" and at consolidating their cooperation in the struggle against "imperialism and Israeli aggression." In the same speech, Kosygin warned against anticommunist and anti-Soviet slogans spread by "enemies of the Arabs" bent on sowing seeds of mistrust toward the Arabs' friends and creating a rift in Soviet-Arab relations. The communique does not repeat the February Moscow communique's indictment of imperialist efforts to spread anticommunist and anti-Soviet feelings.

TALKS WITH KURDS, Moscow's interest in unity of the
COMMUNISTS "progressive forces" in Iraq was under-
 scored by Kosygin's remarks in his
ar-Rumaylah speech on the 7th, as well as by his separate meetings on the 8th with an Iraqi Communist Party (CPI) delegation and with members of the Political Bureau of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK). In ar-Rumaylah, he hailed Iraq's social and economic reforms, the implementation of measures under the 11 March 1970 manifesto on a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem, and the draft National Action Charter of last November. The charter, he noted, provides for the formation of a "front of progressive forces" in the country. In his speech at the treaty ceremony on the 9th, the Soviet leader concluded by wishing Iraq further success in achieving unity of all "national and progressive forces" in the country for the realization of progressive economic and social changes and an anti-imperialist foreign policy. Soviet propaganda, welcoming the establishment last month of Syria's National Progressive Front, has encouraged the Iraqis to form their own such organization, which would include the DPK and the CPI.

While TASS on the 9th only briefly reported Kosygin's meetings with the CPI and DPK representatives, a Moscow broadcast in Arabic that day noted that all Baghdad papers reported the CPI talks and that the DPK organ AT-TA'AKHI reported the meeting with the Kurds. The broadcast said that in the former meeting

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Kosygin expressed satisfaction with the development of relations between Iraq and "other liberated Arab states" as well as of "national relations inside Iraq" and that he welcomed discussions in the country concerning the National Action Charter. According to a Baghdad radio account of the two-hour meeting, CPI First Secretary 'Aziz Muhammad asserted the party's readiness to try to overcome the obstacles to close cooperation, particularly among the Ba'th, the DPK, and the CPI. TASS on the 12th reported a CPI official as welcoming the treaty and pledging efforts to implement it "in close cooperation with other progressive national forces" in Iraq.

Baghdad's account of the Kosygin-DPK talks said "mutual stress" was placed, among other things, on implementation of the 11 March 1970 manifesto and on the formation of a national front. According to Baghdad, the Kurds present were chiefly cabinet ministers. Kurdish leader al-Barzani complained, in a LE FIGARO interview reported by AFP on the 10th, that "these happy encounters are being performed behind our backs" and asserted that the Soviet arms obtained by Baghdad would be used against the Kurds rather than against Iran or Israel.

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DISARMAMENT

MOSCOW HAILS BW ACCORD, URGES BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Soviet publicity for the 10 April signing of the convention on banning the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons has featured President Podgornyy's remarks at the Moscow ceremony. Moscow has duly reported that similar ceremonies were held the same day in London and Washington, with TASS on the 10th noting that President Nixon "attended" the Washington ceremony. The fact that the President delivered a speech was unmentioned, presumably because his remarks were implicitly critical of Moscow's military aid to Hanoi.*

Podgornyy cited the accord as attesting to the possibility of progress, step by step, toward consolidation of international peace "given a desire to reach agreement on international issues." He recalled that the convention had been approved at the 26th session of the UN General Assembly in December and called it a result of "joint efforts by a large number of countries." Routine Soviet commentary, however, has continued to depict the accord as an initiative of the USSR and its allies. A broadcast to North America on the 8th, for example, pointedly reminded listeners that the agreement "was initiated by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries"; and a foreign-language commentary on 29 March, tracing the efforts of the socialist states to ban bacteriological and chemical weapons simultaneously, said they had agreed to proceed with a ban on bacteriological weapons in the face of the West's "negative attitude."

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Podgornyy used the occasion to reaffirm Soviet determination to continue working toward "limiting the arms race, including strategic arms." He viewed the ban on bacteriological weapons as opening "new favorable prospects" for slackening the arms race and as a good example to be followed in the approach to other pressing disarmament problems. In line with Soviet comment since the opening of the latest round

* In reporting the ceremonies in Moscow, Washington, and London for signing of the seabed treaty on 11 February 1971, TASS noted that President Nixon and Secretary Rogers "made speeches" at the Washington ceremony. And it quoted some of President Johnson's remarks in recounting the U.S. ceremony for signing of the nonproliferation agreement on 1 July 1968.

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of the Geneva disarmament talks on 29 February, Podgornyy called for the prohibition of chemical weapons as the next step and characterized as "a new important initiative" the draft treaty submitted by the socialist delegations at the Geneva talks on 28 March.

Routine commentary over the past two weeks has also hailed the draft treaty as an important initiative and has taken the West to task for alleged lack of enthusiasm. Thus a panelist in the 2 April domestic service commentators' roundtable chided the U.S. delegation in Geneva for arguing that it is too early to begin drawing up a treaty; he also rejected observations in the London press that a convention cannot be concluded now "because sufficiently effective means of control are lacking." The same commentator observed that "certain powers" do not want to relinquish the chemical weapons which are "being used by the U.S. interventionists in Indochina, the British punitive forces in Ulster, the Portuguese colonialists in Africa, and by all of them collectively against the antiwar and progressive movements in their respective countries."

V. Ovchinnikov, in an international review article in PRAVDA on 2 April, called a ban on chemical weapons the "next urgent task" after the accord on bacteriological agents, assailing the United States in routine fashion for use of tear gas and defoliants in Indochina and for continued failure to ratify the 1925 Geneva protocol barring the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

GROMYKO: TREATY REJECTION WILL "UNDERMINE" BERLIN ACCORD

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko has made the first official Soviet Government statement publicly linking the implementation of the Big Four Berlin accord with FRG ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties--the so-called "reverse linkage" concept. Addressing a joint session of the foreign affairs committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 12 April, Gromyko declared that if the FRG fails to ratify the two treaties, "this would also undermine the known agreements on West Berlin"--a point Brezhnev had not made in his 20 March Soviet trade union congress speech in passages rebutting West German opponents of ratification.

Gromyko's speech wound up an intensive week of activity involving Soviet relations with both Germanys: SED party chief Honecker was in Moscow 4-10 April for talks with Brezhnev, to which Moscow gave minimal publicity; a long-term Soviet-FRG trade agreement, including a clause providing for FRG competence for West Berlin once the Big Four Berlin accord is implemented, was initialed on the 7th; Bundesrat Chairman Kuehn was in the USSR 3-12 April for talks with Gromyko and Brezhnev on the treaties; and it was announced on the 12th that the joint Soviet-FRG commission for development of economic cooperation will hold its first meeting in Bonn on 19 April. These moves have come just prior to the 23 April Baden-Wuerttemberg state elections and the subsequent scheduled readings of the ratification bills in the West German parliament, thus providing substance to the Brandt-Scheel coalition's argument that the treaties, though not ratified, have already given a visible thrust to developing Soviet-FRG relations.

GROMYKO SPEECH In his speech as reported at length by TASS on the 12th, Gromyko discussed the Soviet Government's views on the treaty and took note of several of the sensitive issues raised by the Bonn opposition. Observing that the "main meaning" of the treaty is that it provides "the necessary political foundation for a radical turn in Soviet-West German relations," Gromyko again stated--like Brezhnev at the trade union congress--that the signing of the treaty was not "a simple matter for the Soviet Union" because of the consequences of World War II and the postwar policies of West German "revanchism." Crediting the Brandt government with "realism," Gromyko stressed the notion that the present treaty is the only

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possible one in "the present conditions of balance" in Europe and reflects the "principle of equality of states." Noting that neither side had been obliged to renounce anything or had received anything at the expense of the other, he said that "the real state of affairs, which existed without the treaty and which does not depend on its recognition or nonrecognition by anyone, is taken as the basis." Gromyko expanded on the notion that both sides accept renunciation of force as the means to settle disputes and that both regard the present European borders as "inviolable," citing the text of the treaty articles on these two points.

Gromyko's remarks included Moscow's first public reference to the "Understanding on the Intentions of the Sides," which the Soviet foreign minister said was "a separate document" distinct from the treaty text. It applied, he added, to the development of GDR-FRG relations "on the basis of full equality and the absence of discrimination," to the process of admitting the two German states to the United Nations, and to "the settlement of issues between the FRG and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic connected with the invalidity of the Munich agreement." Gromyko also "informed" the foreign affairs committees about the Scheel "letter" received by the USSR at the time of the signing on 12 August 1970, which TASS said "outlined" the views of the FRG "on questions of self-determination." TASS noted that the committee members "were familiarized with the text of the letter."

The reverse linkage issue was broached by Gromyko toward the end of his speech, after his enumeration of advances made in Soviet-West German relations since the signing of the treaty. Strongly denouncing the opponents of the two treaties, Gromyko complained that "they are again trying to impose on their country concepts of revanche, of hostility to neighboring peoples and states." But Gromyko did not denounce the Bonn opposition as a whole, stating rather that the opponents of the treaties are concentrated around the "right wing" of the CDU/CSU and thus implicitly recognizing that the entire CDU/CSU faction is not totally committed to non-ratification of the treaties--a theme that has appeared repeatedly in recent Moscow propaganda. Gromyko insisted that the USSR had no "intention of intimidating anyone," adding that it was for the FRG to decide to choose between "friendship and hostility" with the Soviet Union. He continued with minatory overtones:

There will be no friendly and good-neighborly relations if the necessary understanding of the Soviet Union's interests, the minimum of which are reflected in the Moscow treaty, is not displayed in the FRG.

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If it turns out that the Federal Republic has no desire to cooperate with us, naturally we will have to make note of this and draw the appropriate conclusions. The logic of political development shows that a failure of the treaties to enter into force would roll Soviet-West German relations far back. More than that, this would also undermine the known agreements on West Berlin, erect new obstacles on the road of the normalization of relations between the FRG and the GDR, and cross out all that has already been attained between them. All this could not but cause a profound crisis of confidence in the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, with all the resultant consequences.

TASS reported that Gromyko entertained questions on the treaty from the deputies, including one to which he responded: "The Soviet Union will not accept any fresh talks on the treaty." Gromyko said this had been made clear by Brezhnev at the trade union congress, although the CPSU leader had seemingly limited his refusal to conduct new talks to the treaty's provisions on borders.

REVERSE LINKAGE Prior to Gromyko's speech, the only explicit Soviet references to the reverse linkage question had appeared in Moscow radio commentaries. For example, IZVESTIYA's senior political observer Matveyev remarked in the domestic radio roundtable on 12 March that the "West Berlin" agreement was directly dependent on the fate of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, although he stopped short of stating that the Soviet Union would not sign the final quadripartite protocol if the accords were not ratified. More recently, in a commentary on the 7 April initialling of the Soviet-FRG trade agreement, Moscow radio's Yakovlev said that the trade agreement "takes the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin into consideration; the latter will become effective after the ratification" of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties. Gromyko likewise said on the 12th that the trade agreement would take effect after the ratification of the Moscow treaty. Refraining from direct commentary on reverse linkage, the Moscow central press has instead publicized explicit references

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to reverse linkage by such foreign spokesmen as Brandt and GDR Foreign Minister Winzer.*

Soviet commentary on the ratification of the treaties softened appreciably following Brezhnev's speech at the trade union congress. Moscow went so far as to publicize two significant statements by West German leaders on the reunification of the two German states during Honecker's visit to the Soviet Union. IZVESTIYA on the 6th published an interview with Brandt by its Bonn correspondent Tomunyan in which the Chancellor alluded to Brezhnev's trade union congress speech, saying that the "hostility and mutual mistrust" resulting from World War II were felt on both sides. Brandt was further quoted as saying that the "sufferings of the war are not, of course, forgotten in the Soviet Union," but he added that "we have additional problems linked to the division of the German nation." In an even more explicit statement on the reunification of the two Germanys, Bundesrat Chairman Kuehn commented in a Moscow radio interview, broadcast on the 11th to German listeners, that the Moscow and Warsaw treaties "were formulated by the government from the German position and with all reservations for a peace treaty; reunification, for which all of us are striving, was not abandoned."

HONECKER VISIT Moscow's public restraint on the ratification issue was also reflected in its report on GDR leader Honecker's "unofficial friendly" visit to the Soviet Union 3-10 April. Avoiding any appearance of interference in West German affairs, the report simply stated that the impending ratification of the two treaties, "the subsequent coming into force of the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin," and the agreements between the GDR and the FRG and West Berlin Senat should promote further cooperation and normalization of relations between the FRG and the socialist countries. Notably, the report contained no polemical reference to the CDU/CSU opposition to the treaties or to the conventional GDR demand that the FRG recognize the independence and sovereignty of the GDR. The report stated that the meetings between Brezhnev and Honecker were held in an "atmosphere of unanimity, sincerity, and fraternal friendship."

* TASS on 13 March quoted Mikhaylov as commenting in IZVESTIYA that if the treaties were not ratified the Berlin agreement would not be implemented. Whether inadvertently or by design, however, TASS' report did not make it clear that Mikhaylov was paraphrasing a statement made by Brandt. See the TRENDS of 15 March, pages 30-33.

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Presumably because of its "unofficial" nature, Soviet media's coverage of Honecker's visit was minimal. Central media on the 4th and 5th carried a brief TASS report on the GDR leader's arrival but said nothing further about the visit until the 10th, when Moscow radio carried the final report--not described as a communique. Moscow and East Berlin radios reported Honecker's return home on the 10th.

An East Berlin radio commentary by a Moscow correspondent on the 10th noted pointedly that "the week spent by Erich Honecker with Leonid Brezhnev did not meet with great publicity in the press." The first followup Moscow comment on the visit, a radio commentary by Zholkver broadcast to German listeners on the 11th, largely paraphrased the Soviet report on the visit but took a slap at the "reactionary imperialist circles [who] doggedly object" to the developing detente in Europe. A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial on the 12th, as summarized by ADN, refrained from any polemical attacks on West Germany, at the same time pointing out such GDR contributions to the lessening of tension in Europe as the recent arrangements for Easter visits.

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U S S R - B O L I V I A

IZVESTIYA COMMENTS BELATEDLY ON EXPULSION OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS

An IZVESTIYA article on 11 April ended a 13-day silence in Soviet media on the Bolivian Government's 29 March order expelling 119 members of the Soviet Embassy for reasons which remain unspecified, but which by implication involve alleged interference in Bolivian internal affairs. The timing of the article seems related to Western press publicity for the departure of 30 Soviet diplomatic officials from La Paz on 10 April, with additional departures imminent. Moscow had not publicized earlier statements made to newsmen by the Soviet ambassador in La Paz, reported in Bolivian media. The IZVESTIYA article, as reviewed at some length by TASS, now mentions a "statement" issued by the Soviet Embassy which "rejected the attempts to accuse Soviet diplomats of some 'impermissible activity' as absolutely groundless."

Moscow had waited six days before acknowledging the Mexican Government's order on 18 March 1971 expelling five high-ranking Soviet Embassy officers. Its reaction then was at a higher official level--in the form of a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement to the Mexican Embassy in Moscow, terming the charges against the diplomats "totally groundless" and calling the expulsion "an unfriendly act against the Soviet Union." TASS carried a brief report of the 24 March statement, and Radio Moscow gave the same brief report worldwide publicity. But there was no accompanying commentary, where the IZVESTIYA article now indulges in rhetoric about "anti-Soviet actions" multiplying in Latin America--replete with vague charges of behind-the-scenes manipulation by U.S. interests bent on disrupting hemisphere countries' relations with socialist states.

Alleging that in the wake of the August 1971 coup in Bolivia U.S. "monopolies" used "all the levers . . . to disrupt Soviet-Bolivian relations" in a drive to "bolster their shaken positions in the key branches of the Bolivian economy," IZVESTIYA says propagation of the timeworn "myth" about "communist penetration of the Western Hemisphere" and about "Soviet interference" reached a peak with the expulsion order. While thus in effect acknowledging the evident basis for the order, the article--to judge from TASS' summary--nowhere directly imputes charges of Soviet

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interference to the Bolivian Government and is at pains to obscure the large number of diplomats involved, referring to the expulsion order as the Bolivian Government's "invitation to a number of staff members of the USSR Embassy and other Soviet institutions in La Paz to leave the country." IZVESTIYA countercharges that the Bolivian Foreign Ministry "distorts even the data about the number of people in the Soviet colony in La Paz."

The Bolivian Government's action, IZVESTIYA declares, "can only play into the hands of those who are ready to sacrifice the interests of Soviet-Bolivian relations to please the external forces that wish to bring the world back to the worst times of the cold war." Bolivian media had earlier quoted the Soviet ambassador in La Paz as making a stronger and more direct reference to the consequences for Soviet-Bolivian relations in the comment that "measures such as this do not contribute in any way to maintenance of cordial relations between the two governments." IZVESTIYA, portraying the Bolivian action as a link in a chain of anti-Soviet machinations in Latin America, observes that the "short-sighted" decision has caused "perplexity and disapproval in a number of Latin American countries."

IZVESTIYA's line had been foreshadowed on 2 April in a commentary in Spanish to Latin America over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, without direct reference to the Bolivian episode but in apparent allusion to it. The commentary noted a "recent step-up of slanderous attacks against the Soviet Union" in "some" Latin American countries, adding that "the poison of this wretched campaign is aimed against the Soviet diplomatic and trade representations, with the clear objective of worsening the relations with the Soviet Union and preventing the development of recently established economic and cultural relations." Charging that this effort "is led by the United States" and employs "the wornout scarecrow of anti-Sovietism," Radio Peace and Progress cited Costa Rica and Chile as focal points of current U.S. attempts to disrupt developing relations with the Soviet Union.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

UKRAINE PLENUM REBUKES TWO OBKOM LEADERS, REMOVES SOBOL

A 31 March Ukrainian Central Committee plenum on the organizational work of the Voroshilovgrad and Cherkassy oblast party organizations has rebuked the leaders of these two oblasts and removed first deputy premier N.A. Sobol--a close protege of Podgornyy in the Ukraine--from the Ukrainian Politburo. Although the two oblast leaders have no obvious ties with any prominent Ukrainian factions, the criticism of them, like the recent ouster of the Khmelnytskyi obkom leader, appears to be linked to initiatives by Shelest begun at the June 1971 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum on improving leadership of primary party organizations. Shelest's current relations with Sobol are unclear, but the removal of the patron of the Kharkov faction, once the strongest faction in the Ukraine, is bound to affect factional alignments in the Ukraine.

The plenum opened with reports by Voroshilovgrad first secretary V.V. Shevchenko and Cherkassy first secretary A.N. Andreyev on their oblasts' organizational work, followed by speeches by two deputy heads of the Ukrainian Central Committee cadres section P. Ye. Didkovskiy and P.K. Klimenko, who presumably presented their respective assessments of conditions in the two oblasts. After the remaining speeches, Shelest delivered a speech and the plenum adopted a decree criticizing the two oblasts for a wide variety of shortcomings, including poor organizational work and failures in agricultural and consumer goods production. Since the speeches were not published, the decree provides the only substantive information on the transactions of the plenum.

Shelest laid the groundwork for the recent attack in his speech at the 1971 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum. He then criticized the Voroshilovgrad obkom and a local gorkom for not taking effective measures to correct conditions at a Voroshilovgrad mine and for not improving the work of party organizations. He concluded that "the only explanation for this is that leaders of the obkom and gorkom still are not devoting enough attention to primary party organizations of enterprises which lag" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 25 June 1971). Inasmuch as Shelest played the leading role at the June 1971 plenum and in exposing and condemning similar organizational shortcomings in Khmelnytskyi, Kiev and Ternopol earlier this year, he appears to be the prime mover in this campaign of criticism.

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The March plenum also announced the retirement on pension of first deputy premier Sobol and his removal from the Ukrainian Politburo. He was removed as first deputy premier on the same day. Although the state of Sobol's health is unknown, his age, 62, is not excessive (in fact, he is younger than Shelest)--suggesting that he is a victim of political intrigue. Sobol's retirement may be related to shortcomings in industry, especially the lag in the production of consumer goods at Kharkov's heavy industrial enterprises. Shelest in his June 1971 plenum speech was especially critical of Kharkov, remarking that the Ukrainian Politburo recently had examined production of consumer goods at the major Kharkov enterprises and had made "severe criticism" of the leaders of several major enterprises for cutting back or not increasing consumer goods production. Sobol may have been doubly guilty here--as first deputy premier in charge of industry and as senior patron of the Kharkov leaders. Indeed, one of the plants singled out by Shelest--the big Malyshev transport machine building plant--is currently headed by O.V. Soich, an associate of Sobol, and was formerly directed by Sobol himself, who spent most of his career (1929-58) at this plant.

If Sobol's removal from the Politburo was motivated by political reasons, then it represents a setback for Podgornyy. After Podgornyy left Kharkov to become Ukrainian first secretary, Sobol rose in rapid succession from plant director to Kharkov sovnarkhoz chief, Ukrainian sovnarkhoz chief, and Kharkov first secretary. When Podgornyy left the Ukraine in mid-1963, Sobol was placed in charge of cadre work as Ukrainian second secretary. When the CPSU Central Committee adopted a decree in 1965 censuring Kharkov and marking Podgornyy's defeat by Brezhnev, Sobol was the main loser in the Ukraine, being demoted from second secretary to first deputy premier. Since then the Kharkov faction has never regained its predominance in the Ukrainian leadership. Its sole representative in the Politburo now is Kharkov first secretary G.I. Vashchenko, who was party secretary at the Malyshev plant when Sobol was director in 1958 and was later Kharkov first secretary Sobol's top deputy.

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CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SHAKE-UP IN KWANGTUNG LEADERSHIP REVEALED IN NCNA REPORTS

Ting Sheng, commander of the Canton Military Region and a Kwangtung provincial party secretary, has replaced Liu Hsing-yuan as chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee--the first such replacement at the top provincial level to be announced since Lin Piao's fall.

Ting Sheng's appointment was revealed inter alia in NCNA accounts of the Canton reception for Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff. Party identifications were not provided for the Kwangtung officials in attendance, but if the national pattern is followed Ting Sheng will also replace Liu Hsing-yuan as first secretary of the Kwangtung party organization. Liu last appeared publicly on 8 March; his background is that of a PLA commissar closely associated with Huang Yung-sheng, PLA Chief of Staff and former leader in Kwangtung, who was purged along with Lin Piao last fall. Liu's downfall, if it proves to be such, may be assumed to be an outgrowth of the Lin Piao affair and possibly the forerunner of additional shifts at top provincial levels.

Further shifting of the Kwangtung leadership was also revealed in the NCNA identification of Chao Tzu-yang, a recent transfer from Inner Mongolia where he had served as a secretary on the provincial party committee, as a vice-chairman on the Kwangtung revolutionary committee. Chao, who was first secretary of the old Kwangtung party committee and also a secretary of the former Central-South Bureau headed by purged Tao Chu prior to the cultural revolution, may also fill a vacancy on the provincial party committee created by Ting's probable elevation to first secretary.

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